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Abstract
As a prominent and performative discourse, The Smart City has the potential to shape urban
futures. Yet, its mostly top-down implementation and dominantly technocratic definition of prob-
lems raises critiques of The Smart City as the latest version of a series of post-political and neolib-
eral visions of urban governance. However, as smart cities are implemented into ‘actually existing’
strategies locally, they are always negotiated and translated into place-specific contexts. Beyond
critiquing the powerful discourse of The Smart City, the social innovation–(re)politicisation nexus
(SIRN) spells out a framework for contesting and co-producing radically transformative smart city
visions and politics as they take shape on the ground. Linking the empirical case study of the ‘top-
down’ implementation of SmartCity Cologne, Germany, to current ‘bottom-up’ discourses on
reclaiming the urban commons, we show how ‘true’ and ‘real’ social innovation must go hand-in-
hand with a re-politicisation of hegemonic logics and discursive framings. In doing so, this paper
makes theoretical and empirical contributions to public and academic discourse on which govern-
ance practices, methods and policies could contribute to radical transformations towards a ‘truly’
smart and sustainable urban future.
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Introduction
As a powerful and influential discourse, The
Smart City has become a seductive panacea
for the shaping of urban futures (Herrschel,
2013; Hollands, 2015; Luque-Ayala and
Marvin, 2015; McFarlane and Söderström,
2017; McLaren et al., 2015; Vanolo, 2014;
Viitanen and Kingston, 2014). Yet, despite
its performative impact, there remains a
general ambiguity of what The Smart City
exactly is, what sort of futures its vision is
creating, and who has a say in shaping them
(Hollands, 2008; Luque-Ayala and Marvin,
2015).
Critics point to the top-down and techno-
cratic nature of smart policy discourse (Wiig,
2016: 4) and the low or non-existent engage-
ment of citizen participation, even when
participatory decision-making is promised
(Cardullo and Kitchin, 2019; Crivello, 2015;
March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2016). Yet, while
The Smart City often emerges as top-down
and technocratic, smart strategies are never
fully top-down but are always negotiated
and translated into place-specific contexts
(Stollmann et al., 2016). When applied
locally, the general discourse of The Smart
City becomes grounded in a variegated
implementation, or what Shelton et al.
(2015) call the ‘actually existing’ smart city.
In Germany, we see that as a recent pro-
liferation of primarily top-down smart city
strategies are embedded locally, they
encounter a growing bottom-up activism
seeking to reclaim the urban commons
(Baier et al., 2016; Follmann and Viehoff,
2015; Hatzelhoffer et al., 2012; Stollmann
et al., 2016). Reclaiming the commons is a
discourse focused on transforming govern-
ance practices, policies and infrastructure
away from capitalist logics and towards a
more democratic, community-based control.
This discourse has manifested in Germany in
a variety of bottom-up social movements in
which actors from civil society are demand-
ing more inclusion in decision-making and
pursuing alternative forms of urban govern-
ance, including democratic control of munic-
ipal energy provision (Becker et al., 2017)
and circular regional food economies (Thurn
et al., 2018).
With the understanding that the present
is a moment of unprecedented opportunity
and necessity for theorising and constructing
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policies and practices for radical transforma-
tions to sustainability1 (Blythe et al., 2018)
we ask: is there potential in The Smart City
for reconciling top-down and bottom-up
approaches – in Germany and elsewhere –
to co-produce ‘truly smart and sustainable
urban futures’ (McLaren et al., 2015: 3–7)?
To answer this question, we must first exam-
ine how smart and sustainable futures are
currently defined in mainstream, top-down
approaches.
In a proposed comprehensive definition
of The Smart City by Dameri (2017: 137), it
is noted as equally important to define smart
by including ‘smart activities,’ but also
excluding ‘initiatives out of scope’.
Accordingly, what is smart is also defined by
what is not-smart. Since the smart label is
not fixed to any essential meaning but pro-
duced and constituted through discourse,
the defining of ‘smart’ is a site of struggle for
the creation of meaning (Gibson-Graham,
2002: 96). This understanding highlights the
significance of power relations in the con-
struction of smart as a hegemonic discourse,
by which meaning is articulated and ‘fixed’
into practices of smart urban governance (cf.
Mouffe, 2018). Furthermore, this view
carves out possibilities for immanent critique
to transform practices of smart urban gov-
ernance from within by drawing on smart’s
own ‘symbolic references’ (Mouffe, 2018) –
for example, ‘innovation’ and ‘participa-
tion’. Here we see potential to ‘re-articulate’
the ways in which innovation and participa-
tion are translated into smart practices, with
the goal of extending democratic values and
carving out space for alternative innovation
approaches to address urgent social and eco-
logical problems within The Smart City
discourse.
Any strategic interventions which pursue
smart and sustainable futures do not emerge
as inevitable or apolitical; their inherent nor-
mativity, rather, underscores the need for
ethical debate, political negotiation and
pluralistic inclusion of diverse (and critical)
voices (Blythe et al., 2018). Given that, we
will argue that smart city strategies do con-
tain potentials for radical transformations;
but with qualifiers – following the lead of
Maria Kaika’s (2017: 99) ‘real smart cities’
and Duncan McLaren, Julian Agyeman and
Robert Gottlieb’s (2015: 2) ‘truly sustainable
and smart cities’.
The emphasis on these qualifiers (real
and truly) underscores the risk of smartness
and sustainability falling into the post-
political trap (McLaren et al., 2015). The
trap acknowledges critiques that transforma-
tions to sustainability run the risk of being
co-opted into business-as-usual trajectories,
or disciplined by ‘apolitical’ constraints of
neoliberal and financialisation market logics
(Blythe et al., 2018; Paidakaki et al., 2018;
Swyngedouw, 2007; Vanolo, 2014).
However, the use of these qualifiers also
insists that transformations in pursuit of
smart and sustainable futures do have the
potential to be ‘real’ and ‘true’. Our aim in
this paper, therefore, follows those of
(among others) Hollands (2015) and
McFarlane and Söderström (2017). These
scholars have highlighted the need to move
beyond a mere critique of smart urbanism,
setting new parameters of debate for which
governance practices, methods and policies
could lead to a smart and sustainable urban
future. It is to such a task of intervention in
the smart urbanism discourse that we hope
to contribute.
The remainder of this paper comprises
two main parts: the first develops a theoreti-
cal framework and the second is an empiri-
cal case study of SmartCity Cologne (SCC).
The theoretical section begins with a brief
overview of critical literature on The Smart
City. It discusses how smart city strategies
have externalised innovation, meaning that
socio-political innovation is foreclosed as
existing configurations are seen as inevitable.
Next, we develop a theoretical framework
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that deconstructs this inevitability and
carves out spaces in which alternative visions
could gain traction in The Smart City.
Drawing on Swyngedouw’s (2018) ‘post-
politicisation’ concept (which we explain
below), our framework argues for a pluralis-
tic and open stance to heterodox approaches
and practices in governance, which include
the possibility of innovating socio-political
configurations (i.e. institutional arrange-
ments, power asymmetries, participation
processes, etc.). We call this the social inno-
vation–(re)politicisation nexus (SIRN) as we
argue that real social innovation cannot be
achieved without re-politicisation and vice
versa. The nexus represents the meeting
point of these two concepts, resulting in a
‘bottom-linked governance’ (Eizaguirre
et al., 2012) which aims to synthesise the ten-
sions between the conceptual extremities of
top-down policies and bottom-up practices
(Baker and Mehmood, 2015) by internalis-
ing conflict and making space for heterodox
alternatives within institutionalised demo-
cratic governance.
In the empirical section we illustrate an
example of the opportunities and challenges
that emerge for the unpacking of the SIRN.
We do so by translating The Smart City into
an actually existing smart city in Germany:
SmartCity Cologne (SCC). In particular, our
analysis of Cologne’s smart city politics,
first, provides a particular insight into how
actually existing smart city actions and poli-
cies are assembled locally (Vanolo, 2014;
White, 2016). Second, we document an addi-
tional case of contrast between actually exist-
ing processes of decision/policy-making and
the citizen-centric rhetoric often associated
with smart cities (Cardullo and Kitchin,
2019; Hodson and Marvin, 2017; Joss et al.,
2017; Wiig, 2016). Finally, we focus atten-
tion in the latter discussion in our paper on
opportunities and challenges for unpacking
the SIRN – in Cologne, and beyond to other
smart city strategies and urban governance
practices.
The Smart City: The critique
Much of the sustainability argument has evac-
uated the politics of the possible, the radical
contestation of alternative future socio-
environmental possibilities and socio-natural
arrangements, and silences the radical antag-
onisms that are constitutive of our socio-
natural orders by externalizing conflict.
(Swyngedouw, 2007: 26)
For a growing body of critical literature,
The Smart City is understood as ‘the techno-
logical version of a sequence of neoliberal-
infused new urban visions’ (Kitchin, 2015:
132), whereby existing trajectories of capital-
ist growth are reinforced as the primary
means for driving urban development
(Cugurullo, 2018; Grossi and Pianezzi, 2017;
Viitanen and Kingston, 2014). Innovation in
The Smart City is, therefore, mostly limited
to technological and digital advancements
rooted in market-economic logics, while
foreclosing more general socio-political
innovation (Taylor Buck and While, 2017;
White, 2016). Specifically, as smart cities
have been mobilised to deliver urban sus-
tainability, approaches and strategies have
focused on the ‘promotion of efficiency and
growth, the control of individual and house-
hold behaviour, and the mediation of con-
sumer culture’ (Martin et al., 2018: 276).
Following these critiques, we see The
Smart City’s innovation to be generally
externalised, which here means two things.
First, by considering existing politico-
institutional configurations and economic
trajectories as inevitable, innovation is
directed towards visions of apolitical
‘techno-utopian’ solutions (Luque-Ayala
and Marvin, 2015; Taylor Buck and While,
2017). Here it is assumed that smart
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technologies alone will lead to better urban
futures. Second, smart policymakers have
valued external expert knowledge over local
citizen knowledge (Shelton et al., 2015;
Söderström et al., 2014). In doing so, policy-
makers focus on the materiality of the city
and its competitive position relative to other
cities, rather than the materiality of the citi-
zens and their place-specific needs and capa-
cities (Bauriedl, 2017).
In line with these visions, The Smart City
has not only internalised the ecological mod-
ernisation agenda of sustainable develop-
ment, it also epitomises the link between
entrepreneurialism and (a kind of) environ-
mentalism that opens up new waves of (pri-
vate) investment for city governments and
new opportunities for profit-making in the
private sector. We interpret the smart city,
then, as an ‘urban sustainability fix’ (While
et al., 2004). While et al.’s (2004) notion of
the ‘urban sustainability fix’ is defined as an
institutional strategy for ‘safeguard[ing]
growth trajectories in the wake of industrial
capitalism’s long downturn, the global ‘‘eco-
logical crisis’’ and the rise of popular envir-
onmentalism’ (p. 551). The ‘fix’ of The
Smart City allows cities to position them-
selves as green forerunners in the context of
global inter-urban competition for capital
investment and funding schemes, while selec-
tively targeting environmental problems
(Herrschel, 2013; Rosol, 2013; Temenos and
McCann, 2012).
Insofar as many smart city strategies con-
tinue to follow these developments, The
Smart City enters urban policy-making as
an updated ‘technology of austerity urban-
ism’ (Pollio, 2016), or a re-framing of ‘neo-
liberal ideology’ (Cardullo and Kitchin,
2018; Grossi and Pianezzi, 2017). Therefore,
The Smart City has often been integrated into
already existing apolitical governance tenden-
cies (Béal, 2012) and resonates with the ‘post-
democratic’ or ‘post-political’ (MacLeod,
2011; Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2007)
debate. In particular, Mouffe (2005) has
warned that consensus politics are a serious
danger to (urban) democracy. This danger
has been described by Béal (2012) as a process
by which elite coalitions first select and priori-
tise what they view as urban problems; and,
second, compose a decision-making network
and substantive policies based on the interests
of elite coalitions, rather than democratic rep-
resentation. In this process a hegemonic con-
sensus is constructed, while contestation and
conflict, along with grassroots actors, are
externalised (Swyngedouw, 2007: 26).
Indeed, cities are not made smart because
of citizen requests (Stollmann et al., 2016: 6).
Critics have, rather, seen The Smart City as a
‘top-down, technocratic policy discourse’
(Wiig, 2016: 4). Furthermore, empirical stud-
ies have shown that actually existing smart
city projects are planned and implemented
without public participation (Cardullo and
Kitchin, 2019; Crivello, 2015; Stollmann
et al., 2016). Although participatory decision-
making processes are often promised as part
of smart city agendas, participation is often
limited to the creation of new technological
advancements including digital e-governance
tools (Afzalan et al., 2017), without attention
to existing power asymmetries.
Yet, we argue that smart urbanism is not
inherently top-down – even if ‘corporate
storytelling’ suggests this (Söderström et al.,
2014). Rather, local implementation is
always politically contested and can even
shift from strictly top-down to more bot-
tom-linked. Although smart city platforms
often do emerge as apolitical and top-down,
they are always negotiated and translated
into place-specific contexts (Stollmann et al.,
2016). This has been seen recently in
Barcelona, where Cardullo and Kitchin
(2018) detail the re-politicisation of the
smart city project: away from domination
by state and private interests and towards
the inclusion of citizen/community interests
and civic society movements. Therefore,
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smart city politics emerge as context-specific
and the smart label as dynamic.
This moment of translating The Smart
City into the ‘actually existing’ smart city is
a site of struggle, with potential for the cre-
ation of meaning. Smart urban futures can
either be discursively constructed into exist-
ing apolitical governance tendencies, or the
approaches and methods for constituting
smart and sustainable development can be
repurposed and re-politicised (Gibbs et al.,
2013; Hollands, 2015; Kaika, 2017;
McFarlane and Söderström, 2017; March
and Ribera-Fumaz, 2016; Martin et al.,
2018). Yet, more detailed empirical studies of
actually existing smart cities are needed to
carve out different variants. In particular, it is
yet to be determined if and how actually exist-
ing smart city initiatives can be re-politicised.
And, likewise, how counter-hegemonic voices
of environmental movements, subaltern
groups and ordinary citizens can be incorpo-
rated into and empowered by actually existing
smart city strategies. The next section pro-
poses a framework for beginning to unlock
political potential within The Smart City.
The social innovation–
(re)politicisation nexus (SIRN):
Carving out political potential in
smart urbanism
The Smart City embodies the potential to
transform urban futures. However, as we
have argued above, the inherent normativity
of transformation requires a re-politicisation
of The Smart City discourse. Re-politicisa-
tion necessitates a simultaneous internalisa-
tion of innovation; breaking from The
Smarty City’s predominantly externalised
conception and practice of innovating.
Internalisation means that social relations –
including governance arrangements, pro-
cesses, methods and approaches – are incor-
porated into the scope of smart innovation,
with a stance of openness to heterodoxy. As
we consider re-politicisation and social inno-





For Swyngedouw (2018), post-politicisation
is a particular form of de-politicisation by
which hegemonic (urban) governance
arrangements and principles are increasingly
seen as outside of the realm of democratic
politics. The post-political, in other words, is
seen to equate arbitrary constraints with
social objectivity (cf. Mouffe, 2000). The
constraints, as such, become taken-for-
granted assumptions beyond historical con-
tingency – creating an illusory ‘end of his-
tory’. Politics is, in this way, ‘economised’,
as mainstream economic logics (e.g.
neoliberal-economics and financialisation)
become fixtures of social reality with politi-
cal agency and the ability to transcend ethi-
cal debate and political negotiation
(Swyngedouw, 2018: 32). In short, the post-
political economy, disembedded from the
messiness of social relations, can make deci-
sions for us.
Following these perspectives, we see the
political as a space of democratic disagree-
ment and negotiation, and a moment in the
process through which ‘normal politics’ is
transformed (Swyngedouw, 2018: 56). Yet,
re-politicisation is not an end in itself – as
the political is not ‘more important than
actually existing instituted politics’
(Swyngedouw, 2018: 56). The aim of re-
politicisation is, rather, to transform politics
in instances where existing hegemonies limit
capacities for addressing and meeting social
problems and needs. We emphasise that
there can be neither a blueprint normative
vision of The Smart City – nor a script of
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intervention for its re-politicisation (cf.
Gibson-Graham, 2006).
A process of politicisation, Swyngedouw
(2018: 24–25) tells us, begins with an ‘inau-
gural event’ of staging democratic disagree-
ment, which cannot be named in advance by
social theory. This leads us to social innova-
tion, a concept that we see as an approach
through which citizens generate alternative
plans when mainstream state- and market-
led solutions do not meet local needs.
Social innovation: Generating alternatives
As an in-vogue concept, social innovation
has generated an ‘admittedly confusing
debate’, as it has been mobilised in various
ways by different groups, from public and
state entities to radical democratic theorists
(Paidakaki et al., 2018: 12). Critics have
argued that since institutional discourse on
social innovations in governance have been
confined within narrowly market-economic
terms, the concept is doomed to fall into the
post-political trap and further exclude mar-
ginalised groups (Swyngedouw, 2005). Yet,
social innovation remains useful (again with
the qualifier of re-politicisation) for framing
transformative social change and generating
context-specific alternatives to dominant
urban development models and approaches
(Blanco and León, 2017; Nyseth and
Hamdouch, 2019), such as those assumed
inevitable in The Smart City. We follow here
Ulug and Horlings (2019: 14), who clearly
define social innovations as being comprised
of, on the one hand, a process (i.e. new rules
or organisations of social relations); and
on the other hand, a product or end result
(i.e. satisfying unmet social needs and mak-
ing social contributions, including the
empowerment of communities) (Baker and
Mehmood, 2015).
Blanco and León (2017), in particular,
have documented how confrontational social
innovation can lead to a ‘process of political
empowerment’ (p. 2185), through their case
study of the negotiation of a new affordable
housing policy in Barcelona. This case dis-
plays the potential effectiveness of conflict
for shifting power relations in urban govern-
ance among civil society (especially margina-
lised actors), the market and different levels
of government (González et al., 2010).
Besides confrontation, movements to reclaim
the urban commons can offer opportunities
for disruptive social innovation through
reconfigurations of physical spaces and
infrastructures towards community owner-
ship and operation. We see such commons-
oriented movements to include political
urban gardening (Certomà and Tornaghi,
2015; Follmann and Viehoff, 2015) and food
movements (Thurn et al., 2018), as well as
re-municipalisation of urban service delivery
and energy democracy (Becker et al., 2017;
Cumbers and Becker, 2018). All of these
examples display ‘painstaking efforts’
(Kaika, 2017: 99) of intervention, in which
needs – for example, sustainability or social
justice – are so urgent that citizens are driven
to take on new ‘do-it-yourself’ (Baier et al.,
2016) roles in urban governance processes.
As such civil society movements in physical
urban space are often supported by (trans-
local) digital communities, smart technolo-
gies could be seen as a potential facilitator of
disruptive, community-empowering social
innovations (cf. Martin et al., 2018). If smart
city strategies were open to such innovations,
smart technologies could become a key
driver by which ‘individuals and groups
come to see themselves as shaping/governing
economic processes rather than as simply
subjected to them’ (Gibson-Graham and
Roelvink, 2009: 35).
As with re-politicisation, however, we
emphasise that social innovation cannot be
understood as a ‘normative recipe for sol-
ving all human and social problems in any
context’ (Nyseth and Hamdouch, 2019: 2,
emphasis added). Many may argue that past
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attempts to reclaim the commons with pub-
lic ownership have been ‘disappointing, if
not disastrous’ (Cumbers, 2012: 62); or that
breaking away from fixed policy paths con-
tains too much risk and uncertainty (Nyseth
and Hamdouch, 2019). We would not dis-
pute such arguments. Yet, we argue the ben-
efit of social innovation lies rather in its
ability to keep ‘windows of democratic dia-
logue’ open (Nyseth and Hamdouch, 2019:
4). This includes using pluralism and hetero-
dox thinking to break from path dependency
when necessary; and reflexivity for when
plans fail and need to be adjusted (cf.
Cumbers, 2012). As such, social innovation
is seen as a way for empowered citizens to
generate and experiment with governance
alternatives – if and when plans or models
proposed by the state and private market
limit the capacities for addressing place-
specific needs and problems. This brings us
to the nexus: ‘bottom-linked’ governance,
which aims to synthesise the tensions
between bottom-up practices and top-down
policies by internalising conflict (Eizaguirre
et al., 2012).
The nexus: Internalising conflict with
bottom-linked governance
The concept of ‘bottom-linked governance’
forms the nexus of the SIRN as it combines
the focus on institutional innovation in re-
politicisation with the focus on bottom-up
alternatives generated through social innova-
tion (Eizaguirre et al., 2012). As such,
bottom-linked governance is a method for
incorporating ‘invented’ spaces of participa-
tion into ‘invited’ institutional channels
(Miraftab, 2004). The result is a dynamic
process of participation (Silver et al., 2010)
in which bottom-linked governance is ‘materi-
alized through constant and varied interac-
tions between socially innovative actors and
institutional structures’ (Paidakaki et al.,
2018: 14, emphasis added).
Bottom-linked governance has emerged
in response to a perceived paradox in con-
temporary multilevel governance, in which
the institutional imperative of citizen partici-
pation has not necessarily coincided with
citizen empowerment (Eizaguirre et al.,
2012: 2009). Several authors have, thus,
identified the need for invited participation
in urban governance to make space for
invented spaces of conflict, contestation and
antagonism, which for agonistic theorists
such as Mouffe (2000, 2005) define demo-
cratic politics. Eizaguirre et al. (2012) articu-
late a bottom-linked governance that is
closely related to Mouffe’s agonistic model
of democracy. While recognising the oppor-
tunity for ‘real’ participation in invited insti-
tutional policy-making, Eizaguirre et al.
(2012) stress that bottom-linked practices
require institutions to develop capacities and
procedures for an ongoing engagement with
conflict, dissent and disagreement (p. 2010).
However, the strength of bottom-linked gov-
ernance can be found in its emphasis on
avoiding the ‘local trap’ (Purcell, 2006), that
is, the attempt to solve all problems at the
local level or give a priori preference to, for
example, purely horizontal organisational
models. Informed by these perspectives, we
move next into our empirical case study of
Cologne.
Data collection and methods
Empirical data on SCC were collected
through various qualitative methods in 2017
and 2018. The research began with a review
of publications by actors involved in SCC
project management (e.g. Möhlendick,
2017), websites of SCC project management
(www.smartcity-cologne.de) and funders, a
study which included SCC project manage-
ment interviews (Brandt et al., 2016), and a
more general review of coinciding develop-
ment plans for the city of Cologne (e.g.
Bauwens-Adenauer and Soénius, 2009).
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Based on this review we identified actors in
the project management team for interviews.
Semi-structured interviews were then con-
ducted with six members of the SCC project
management team (see Figure 1) from pri-
vate and public sectors. Questions focused
on the history of the actors’ organisation,
their roles in SCC, an interpretation of what
‘innovation’ meant for SCC, and encoun-
tered and anticipated difficulties. These
interviews all lasted from 45 to 60 minutes.
Further interviews were conducted with
five leaders of citizen initiative groups in
Cologne. These groups were selected based
on their activism in areas consistent with the
goals of SCC, namely, climate and environ-
mental protection and citizen participation.
Semi-structured questions were developed in
advance for these interviews but discussions
were more open-ended and ranged from 45
to 90 minutes in length. These interviews
focused on motivations underlying activism
and gauged the extent to which active citi-
zens saw SCC as open to and productive for
engagement. Participants in all interviews
agreed in advance to be recorded and tran-
scripts were made in all cases. Follow-up
personal communications with participants
have also been included as data. Finally,
participant observation, including informal
interviews and detailed notes on presenta-
tions and discussion sessions, was conducted
during the SmartCity Cologne Conferences
in 2017 and 2018. All qualitative data were
analysed using a critical discourse and narra-
tive approach, which focused on how lan-
guage was used to create meaning.
Cologne’s smart city platform
Locally framing smartness
SmartCity Cologne (SCC) was founded in
2011, in a joint partnership between the
municipal energy provider, RheinEnergie
(RE), and the city of Cologne. We see the
implementation of SCC to have been influ-
enced by two main trends in the German
Figure 1. SmartCity Cologne structure.
Source: own draft based on various sources.
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context: austerity-inclined fiscal policies at
various levels of German government and
the federal government’s Energiewende
(Energy Transition) policy. In line with
recent global trends of intensified fiscal aus-
terity (Peck et al., 2009), German municipali-
ties have experienced a steady increase in
indebtedness and a decrease in leverage to
impose taxes on trade (Gewerbesteuer) and
land (Grundsteuer), because of an amplified
competition among cities to attract busi-
nesses and private capital (Keller, 2014). As
it began to face de-industrialisation in the
1980s, the city of Cologne became focused on
facilitating economic growth and building a
strong employment market, through public–
private partnership and cost-efficiency con-
siderations in planning (Mattissek, 2008).
These factors, among others, have
resulted in a policy of fiscal discipline and
Cologne has repeatedly been in danger of
falling into insolvency. To maintain budgets
under declining tax revenue, German muni-
cipalities have implemented the corporatisa-
tion of municipal utility companies, which
have been traditionally tasked with provid-
ing urban services. Cross-subsidisation
between the different municipal utility com-
panies has always played an important role
in financing municipal public services in
Germany: for instance, the profits from
energy providers have been used to offset
operating losses of services such as public
transport. Therefore, the municipal energy
sector has always played a multifunctional
role for German city governments. While
corporatisation and European competition
laws have restricted cross-subsidisation (cf.
Bulkeley and Kern, 2006), the energy sector
has continued to be a very important factor
for many municipal budgets and the close con-
nection between municipal governments and
‘their’ utility companies remains (e.g. senior
members of city government sit on supervisory
boards of municipal corporations).
In parallel with these developments, the
German Energy Transition policy and result-
ing market changes have put municipalities
which rely on the profits of ‘their’ energy util-
ities under threat of a ‘massive loss of market
share, revenues, and profits’ (Richter, 2013,
pp. 1226–1227). Since Cologne is, partly
through city-owned subsidiaries, the majority
shareholder of RE with 80% ownership
(RheinEnergie, 2017: 29), the municipal
energy supplier’s steady profits are a major
supporter of the city budget. RE is, accord-
ingly, an exceptionally powerful actor with
regard to city financing and the implementa-
tion of the Energy Transition in Cologne.
For this reason, the company has been the
main driver of SCC from the beginning.
Owing to the inertia (i.e. long-term capi-
tal assets, networks and holdings) of conven-
tional power production with fossil fuels, it
is in the financial interest of RE’s profitabil-
ity to resist radical transformation and oper-
ate with a business as usual approach for as
long as possible, while at the same time
slowly building up capabilities for renewable
generation (Richter, 2013: 1228). This cre-
ates a profitability paradox for the city in
the energy transition: maintain revenue
streams while facing the imperative to trans-
form power production. Based on these
influences, we argue, the local framing of
smartness in Cologne can only be under-
stood based on the close connection between
the city government and the energy provider
RE, and the profitability paradox, which
both actors face under the energy transition.
Origins, structure and goals of SCC
Smartness in Cologne is framed as a central
and multi-faceted approach to transform
Cologne into a sustainable/climate-friendly
city. The key goal of SCC is climate protec-
tion, as this is viewed as ‘the linchpin of a
sustainable and resilient city’ and defined as
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the major urban challenge in the coming
decades (Möhlendick, 2017: 26).2 Thus, SCC
is framed as an urban environmental gov-
ernance ‘platform’ by its founders; not as an
urban development agenda. Consequently,
SCC is managed by the coordination office
for climate protection (Koordinationsstelle
Klimaschutz), which is institutionalised
within the city’s administration in the depart-
ment responsible for social, integration and
environmental affairs, rather than urban
planning. It is further framed as a supple-
mentary/complementary action for climate
protection alongside other activities outlined
in the Integriertes Klimaschutzkonzept Köln
2013 (Integrated Concept of Action for
Climate Protection).
The organisational structure of SCC is
notably top-down, which is reasoned by the
city government to be necessary for the
initiation phase (Möhlendick, 2017). This
top-down phase is still said to be temporary,
as a bottom-up approach is stated as a goal
of SCC as a whole.3 It is, however, unclear
how long the top-down ‘phase’ will last,
since there have been no structural changes
since the strategy began in 2011. At present,
SCC has three main levels of hierarchy
through which goals and financing are
developed and projects are implemented (see
Figure 1). At the top, a steering committee is
led by the mayor of Cologne, three members
from the city administration and four board
members of the Stadtwerke Köln GmbH
(the city-owned corporation holding shares
in RE). Second, is an advisory board made
up of local universities, research institutes
and corporations giving scientific counsel for
projects and policy. Finally, at the implemen-
tation level, various projects – which are pro-
posed and carried out by a variety of
entrepreneurial actors – are then coordinated
by a project management team, made up of
employees from RE and the city of Cologne.
SCC began with five projects in 2011 and
today about 45 projects have received the
SCC label.4 Projects are either developed
specifically for SCC or existing projects are
promoted and given the SCC label, provid-
ing that they conform to the SCC fields of
action, which include climate protection,
energy efficiency, innovation and an inte-
grated approach to governance.5 Much of
SCC’s focus thus far has been on energy-
efficient technologies and carbon emission
reduction. Additionally, various economic
(e.g. job creation, attraction of investment
and start-ups), ecological (e.g. prevention of
air pollution, climate-friendly development
and mobility) and social (e.g. integrated par-
ticipation, quality of life) benefits are pro-
jected as quasi by-products of SCC policies
and projects (Möhlendick, 2017: 31). Yet, it
remains opaque why certain initiatives are
labelled smart, while others, which also deal
with urban sustainability, are not.
Elite post-politics of smart city austerity
Our interviewees consistently revealed that
the greatest difficulty facing SCC and the
city of Cologne is that all projects and goals
must be pursued on a stressed municipal
budget (see also: Möhlendick, 2017: 26). For
example, in an official notice of the city
administration outlining the concept of the
SCC to local politicians in 2012, the SCC
coordination office argues that
in view of the limited availability of municipal
resources and the intended positive publicity,
the economic viability of the measures carried
out is of great importance. Projects that could
only be realized through massive subsidies
would miss the goal of positively motivating
Cologne’s citizens and companies. However,
in the sense of a role model function [.] pilot
and lighthouse projects must be realized which
can only demonstrate indirect profitability
[mittelbare Wirtschaftlichkeit].6
Interviewed city officials further voiced con-
cerns that ‘everyone wants to see the city
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[.] push climate protection forward, but
there is usually not enough money to do so,
there are not the right laws to do so [.].
Climate protection for a city in Germany is
not mandatory [.] only when a certain task
is mandatory is the city receiving funds from
the state or from the federal state [.]. So
basically, all [city staff] payment and activities
are free, and Cologne is not a rich city.’7
The assumed necessity for SCC projects to
generate profitability creates a structural
dependency on private companies and ‘start-
ups’ as the primary bearers of innovation. This
necessity contradicts the stated goal of creating
a ‘bottom-up’ approach for SCC. It also
neglects a multiplicity of possible innovations
which are not primarily directed towards (capi-
talist) economic objectives (cf. Jessop et al.,
2013).
The understanding that, without private
funding, SCC ‘would not work at all’8 is
widespread, despite some city officials being
aware of contradictions posed from reliance
on private funding – even in the case of SCC
co-founder RE. According to SCC staff,
‘RheinEnergie has the aim to make profit,
so they have other interests than the city
hall. [.] This can be very challenging.’9 The
conflict of private funding was additionally
noted by RE’s project management, who
stated that the difficulty of finding firms to
fund projects, because of limited profitabil-
ity, was perhaps SCC’s greatest challenge.10
The reliance on outsourcing solutions to
private companies causes a focus on the
demand side (i.e. changing consumer/house-
hold behaviour), while the supply side is
fixed (cf. Cardullo and Kitchin, 2018; Martin
et al., 2018). Mediation on the consumer side
can lead to economic difficulties, which was
outlined by a city official as follows:
If we want to implement new technologies to
get our households and buildings more energy
efficient, it brings costs. And where do the
costs end? Usually at the tenant, or the
owners.11
For example, in the case of the SCC
project, Grow Smarter – a European Union-
sponsored retro-fitting of a 1950s-built
low-to-middle class neighbourhood called
Stegerwaldsiedlung, with new smart-climate
technologies – the same official stated:
It’s really a tough problem because such a
topic like climate protection innovation is so
far away from the daily life of these people
[.] they only have in mind how do they get
through the next month with their money.12
As a consequence of these economic difficul-
ties, in interviews SCC experts expressed the
need to convince citizens that smart-climate
technologies are for their own good. RE offi-
cials convey this challenge in terms of the
Climate Street project:
We have implemented all of the possible cli-
mate protection technologies in a confined
space [the Climate Street project], in order to
bring [technologies] closer to the citizens so
that they can also see that we can use new
technologies without bringing harm to them,
i.e. financially.13
So, clearly, SCC actors are well aware of the
economic challenges residents face. Yet, the
involvement of residents in top-down proj-
ects such as Grow Smarter is closer to being
informed about, rather than being included
from the start in the decision-making about
how ‘their’ houses will be made climate-
friendly. One city official acknowledged a
need for improvement in participation efforts,
stating ‘when it comes to implementation the
people are not questioned anymore’.14
Deficits in participation are, however,
viewed as unavoidable in the current setup
because of the limited staff and financial
resources of the city, which further
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underlines the dominant logics of auster-
ity.15 Thus, despite efforts to limit rent
increases in the Grow Smart project16 and
make office hours available for resident con-
sultation,17 citizen engagement and partici-
pation in SCC projects is mainly
conceptualised in terms of consumerism,
rather than the contribution to decision- and
policy-making.
Opportunities for citizen engagement
beyond elite post-politics?
Public participation is a central point of
SmartCity Cologne: Cologne’s residents have
the opportunity to get involved and to notice-
ably impact the lifestyle of their city.18
(SmartCity Cologne Website)
The SCC website invites everyone to partici-
pate and a bottom-up approach is stated as
a goal.19 However, the ‘actually existing’
extent of measurable citizen participation is
limited to 15-minute brainstorming sessions
during the annual SmartCity Conference,
where citizens are invited to express their
concerns or ideas based on predefined ques-
tions. Additionally, two contests have been
held for idea generation (one at a local uni-
versity and one at an elementary school).20
Yet, so far there has been no example of a
citizen idea or initiative being included
under the SCC label in the first eight years.21
Interviews with citizen activists even sug-
gested that awareness of SCC is low, despite
a lively network of grassroots initiatives and
action in related fields. One citizen activist
was, indeed, surprised to learn that SCC was
addressing climate protection.22 Another
lamented, ‘[SCC] is public relations. It is a
RheinEnergie ‘‘image thing’’ [.] it’s not
going to move on climate change.’23
Seemingly, SCC aims to raise ‘greater accep-
tance and greater commitment to the imple-
mentation of measures by improving
cooperation with citizens,’24 rather than
developing new ideas with them. Thus, the
situation is not much different than in other
European smart cities (Cardullo and
Kitchin, 2019; Crivello, 2015; March and
Ribera-Fumaz, 2016).
However, there seem to be several differ-
ences in Cologne. Not only does the SCC
leadership display a clear commitment
towards public participation, Cologne’s
mayor has established a city-wide dialogue
aiming to develop guidelines for public par-
ticipation25 and continue structural reforms
within the city administration. One city offi-
cial stated that, ‘a change of governance and
a change of processes within the city’ are a
major component of SCC.26 As part of the
emphasis on facilitating participation, the
mayor of Cologne has established a paid
position within the city administration that
is solely dedicated to structurally reforming
the city administration and generating social
innovation. One example is found in meet-
ings between citizens and the municipal gov-
ernment. These meetings aim to facilitate
collective cross-learning, for example, a
‘Schlaumacherei’,27 which, literally trans-
lated, means ‘making-clever workshop’ or
the ‘Stadtgespräche: Kölner Perspektiven
2030’, in which Colognés mayor discusses
with citizens about future perspectives for
the city. Therefore, we see a structural poten-
tial for alternative framings of Cologne’s smart
city discourse within the city administration.
Adding to this, local grassroots organisa-
tions want to participate and bring their
ideas to make Cologne more sustainable and
climate-friendly. However, so far, their ideas
and actions are not labelled as being part of
SCC even if they deal with very similar
issues. One example of Cologne’s lively citi-
zen groups is the umbrella initiative AGORA
Köln.28 The initiative was formed in 2013 by
civil society organisations (including envi-
ronmental groups), creative artists and local
businesses, and today comprises more than
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130 groups. AGORA is engaged in several
bottom-up projects and policy initiatives,
including an alternative mobility concept
and an action plan for re-organising
Cologne’s food system. Thus, opportunities
for SCC to benefit from grassroots inclusion
exist – and there are signs that such integra-
tions are beginning to take shape. Most
recently, AGORA was invited to present its
activities at a stall during the Cologne Smart
City Conference 2018. Therefore, we see the
potential for alternative framings of
Cologne’s smart discourse through the
widely proclaimed willingness of the local
government to facilitate citizen knowledge.
As declared by one city official, ‘I always
emphasize that we are in a process and
everyone can have an influence on this pro-
cess. We are not determined at all to go in
this direction, or that direction.’29
Discussion: Opportunities and
challenges for a re-politicisation of
The Smart City
So, what potentials exist within Cologne’s
platform; and where do we see opportunities
and challenges for a re-politicisation of
Cologne’s smart city approach towards
transformative social innovations? Bringing
the SIRN to the politics of SCC, here we
spell out what the SIRN could look like in
Cologne. Our analysis shows that in
Cologne – as elsewhere – ‘no straightforward
narrative about the smart city’ exists beyond
RE’s and others’ ‘corporate storytelling,’ as
the other actors’ motives are diverse and
‘politically variegated’ (Söderström et al.,
2014: 318). Alternative visions need to
deconstruct hegemonic storylines about what
the smart city is in the case of Cologne. They
also need to formalise bottom-linked proce-
dures for co-producing smart and sustainable
transformations. In Cologne, we see several
opportunities and barriers in this context.
First, as long as SCC is narrowly viewed
as an urban environmental governance
approach for climate protection and is not
reframed as a more holistic urban strategy,
its impacts remain limited. In particular,
other municipal departments – such as urban
planning – are barely involved at present.
The administrative changes outlined above
show a potential for change. However, the
broadening of SCC to become a mainstream
strategy for urban transformation in
Cologne would require a strategic process.
This would entail a diverse range of stake-
holders, from inside and outside the city
administration, to participate and redefine
what ‘smart’ means for urban development
in Cologne. Such a participation process
could be modelled after the inclusive stake-
holder participation that took place at the
beginning of Vienna’s smart city initiative
(Exner et al., 2018; Fernandez-Anez et al.,
2018). As the current organisational struc-
ture of SCC would be challenged, this would
likely produce resistance from within the
administration and RE. At the moment, we
see only limited scope for such an opening
and re-politicisation of the SCC from within
as the SCC actors’ willingness to reduce
power asymmetries is low. Moreover, SCC
activities remain largely unchallenged, as
public and political pressure for a re-
visioning of the SCC is generally absent.
Beyond administrative changes, there are
several examples of social innovation in
Cologne that, because of de-politicisation,
have been seen as irrelevant or unrealistic.
In other words, many of Cologne’s civil soci-
ety initiatives striving for sustainability and
increased participation in the city’s urban
governance have been seen as not smart.
Accordingly, a re-politicisation is necessary
to invite Cologne’s active grassroots scene
into SCC. Following Mouffe (2018), we
argue that this re-politicisation of the smart
label could begin through a ‘double move’
of counter-hegemonic articulation. In the
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case of SCC, this ‘double move’ begins, first,
with a ‘disarticulation’, or deconstruction, of
the ways in which ‘innovation’ and ‘partici-
pation’ are mobilised and put into practice.
This move would highlight the current con-
tradictions of SCC. Second, a re-articulation
of ‘innovation’ and ‘participation’ in the
smart discourse could build a ‘chain of
equivalence’ (Mouffe, 2018) with alternative
(bottom-up) approaches for addressing
social and ecological problems that are
already being generated in Cologne’s civil
society. The latter move would require a
new role for citizens beyond that of mere
consumers – namely, an empowerment of
citizen groups to pose meaningful challenges
to the ‘common sense’ of urban politics in
Cologne. Moreover, it would entail a will-
ingness of policymakers to explore alterna-
tive notions of economic health beyond
neoliberal models of growth (e.g. a-growth,
de-growth, or steady-state models, along
with various forms of cooperative/collective
ownership). Such a reframing could widen
the field of possibility for smart development
and begin to change activists’ perception
that SCC is an impotent space for develop-
ing their social innovations.30
In order to illustrate the internal contra-
dictions, and weaken the rationality of the
current SCC configuration, we can look at
an example. Although the existing public
control over RE emerges as a possible entry
for more bottom-up engagement, the pub-
licly owned firm has also suppressed critical
public voices. Currently, the city of Cologne
controls 80% of RE’s shares while the other
20% is controlled by Innogy SE, a subsidiary
of RWE Power AG, which is Europe’s larg-
est producer of lignite coal. Decentralisation
of energy production is a central part of
RE’s plan for new business models in the
coming years (RheinEnergie, 2017).
However, decentralisation here refers to the
means of production and consumption – not
decision-making. One interviewed citizen
group named Tschö RheinEnergie31 – liter-
ally meaning ‘goodbye’ RE – has called for a
re-municipalisation of the energy provider
RE as a part of their campaign to pursue
progressive climate action in the city. The
group argues that re-municipalisation could
decouple RE’s energy investments from the
corporate imperative of high returns and,
consequently, allow for bolder transforma-
tions of Cologne’s energy production in line
with trends across Germany (Becker et al.,
2017; Cumbers and Becker, 2018).
However, in its efforts to develop a politi-
cal dialogue about RE’s business model and
practices – namely, continued reliance on lig-
nite coal – the citizen initiative has encoun-
tered difficulties. For example, RE has filed
a court injunction against the group’s leader
for distributing a critical petition.32 This left
the citizen activist facing a team of corporate
lawyers and 250,000 euros in legal penalties
– which he perceived as an attempt to silence
his confrontational activism.33 Moreover,
Tschö RheinEnergie has been portrayed as
naı̈ve (called well-intentioned but counter-
productive by the city’s Green Party),34 or
difficult to deal with (‘very difficult to agree
on numbers’)35 when it challenges the de-
politicised arrangements of Cologne’s energy
politics. Therefore, major barriers for the
realisation of SIRN remain – namely power
asymmetries – despite the public–private liai-
son around the municipal energy supplier
and an active grassroots scene.
In particular, we have shown that under
austerity politics and given the fact that cli-
mate protection is a ‘not mandatory’36 bud-
getary item in German cities, urban climate
protection still relies on higher-level public
(e.g. EU Grow Smarter) and private funding
on a project basis.37 SCC has been successful
in applying for EU Grow Smarter funding as
SCC’s public–private partnership setup and
actions are in line with the existing EU-funding
schemes. However, Cardullo and Kitchin
(2018) have outlined how EU funding schemes,
908 Urban Studies 57(4)
underpinned by the constraint of ‘neoliberal
ideals’, reinforce ‘[subservience] to the interests
of state and market’, rather than ‘reflecting
and serving the interests of citizens’ (p. 13).
As shown for Cologne, these funding
schemes delimit local possibilities and prede-
fine relevant interlocutors. Cologne is not
alone in this regard, as these issues seem to
pervade many, if not most, smart cities (see
e.g. Cardullo and Kitchin, 2018; Dameri,
2017; Wiig, 2016). In ‘Amsmarterdam’ –
which to some extent served as inspiration
for Cologne – the balancing of smart power
asymmetries also turns out to be difficult. As
in Cologne, although Amsterdam considers
citizens as the ‘final stakeholders’ of its smart
urban strategy, the platform’s structure is
also (still) closed and driven by the founding
core group of actors (Dameri, 2017: 126).
To summarise the challenges that remain
for an unpacking of the SIRN in Cologne
(and beyond): specifically in Cologne’s
urban politics, we have noted a structural
potential in which leaders are making efforts to
engage citizens in participation. Moreover, a
number of citizen groups, such as the umbrella
initiative AGORA, are demanding real engage-
ment and empowerment for co-producing a
sustainable urban future. Recent developments
(bottom-up initiatives and administrative
reforms) open general opportunities for the
SIRN being realised in Cologne. However,
what is missing in Cologne is both an openness
to politico-institutional re-politicisation and a
public pressure to generate social innovation
within SCC – which are again inseparable – to
shift the process of innovating smart transfor-
mations towards the inclusion of alternative
visions.
Conclusion: Unlocking political
potential in the actually existing
smart city
Our goal in this paper has been to intervene
in The Smart City’s influential development
narrative on what approaches, methods and
governance processes constitute the transfor-
mations to smart and sustainable urban
futures. Theoretically, we have agreed with
the many critiques of The Smart City as a
technocratic and top-down discourse. At the
same time, however, we have also advocated
for an openness to possibility – not only
from the top-down ‘invited’ spaces of parti-
cipation making space for dissent, but also
from the bottom-up ‘invented’ spaces, by
engaging with opportunities in the actually
existing smart city. We have argued that this
requires a simultaneous re-politicisation of
politico-institutional arrangements and eco-
nomic trajectories considered inevitable in
mainstream urban development discourse. It
also requires a willingness of policymakers to
engage with heterodox approaches and solu-
tions generated through social innovation.
We have argued that the nexus formed by
these two concepts could be found in an ago-
nistic bottom-linked (Eizaguirre et al., 2012)
approach to governance, that establishes an
ongoing engagement with conflict and makes
room for dissent (Silver et al., 2010).
Empirically, we have demonstrated how
smartness takes shape locally and illustrated
the difficulties and opportunities for the
SIRN to emerge in Cologne. The German
context is unique in the extent to which city
governments have relied on municipal
energy companies to play a multifunctional
role with, for example, cross-subsidisation.
This context sets the stage for Cologne,
where SCC is thus far confined to a narrow
focus on climate change and energy transi-
tion. Moreover, these foci are interpreted
and tailored to the interests of the public–
private liaison around the municipal
energy supplier RE. As such, the smart city
discourse in Cologne perpetuates ‘no alter-
native’ logics and consequently, the reinfor-
cement of elite post-politics. Although SCC
is distinct, its still-closed actor constellation
parallels those of other smart cities (e.g.
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Dameri’s (2017) account of Amsterdam) and
the limited scope and possibility of citizen
participation draws many parallels to other
cities more generally (as shown also for
other cities by Cardullo and Kitchin, 2018;
Späth and Knieling, 2018).
However, de-politicised logics (in the sense
of dependencies and restrictions) do not
derive from smart city platforms or technolo-
gies as such. Rather, as we have shown in
Cologne, they are rooted in municipal finan-
cial restrictions, discursive framings and elite-
consensus; namely, the existing post-political
governance arrangements into which smart
city labels are incorporated. Therefore, The
Smart City is clearly not inherently top-down
or apolitical. Rather, it is specific powerful
actors who depoliticise actually existing
smart city approaches, based on hegemonic
discursive framings. In Cologne, we see this
as the public–private liaison around the
municipal energy supplier framing SCC with
specific discourse in Germany – the energy
transition and municipal austerity – to fore-
close the inclusion of alternative possibilities
and potentials for radical transformations.
Based on the outlined nexus between
social innovation and re-politicisation, we
conclude that there will be no re-
politicisation of smart city strategies without
social innovation and vice versa. Going for-
ward, (smart) city leaders are, thus, tasked
with questions of how to formalise proce-
dures of bottom-linked governance that
democratically define urban problems, co-
produce social and technological innova-
tions and transform the technologically
heavy smart urbanism to a platform for
knowledge, innovated jointly by empowered
communities, the state and private compa-
nies. However, as a necessary precursor, it
remains a policy decision by urban govern-
ments (supported by city administrations)
to open up actually existing smart city plat-
forms for a wider range of actors and ideas,
and allow for a bottom-linked engagement
with dissent in smart city visions.
While our empirical analysis of the politics
surrounding SCC is limited to one case, it
gives a detailed picture of how smartness is
constructed in a distinct way locally. Further,
our approach does not operationalise any
measurement of the impact that smart city
strategies have on sustainability (see e.g.
Yigitcanlar and Kamruzzaman (2018) for car-
bon emissions in UK smart cities). While such
impact measurement studies could be benefi-
cial for future avenues of smart city research,
we see the deconstruction of The Smart City
discourse as a key method for re-politicising
smart urbanism, and future research is needed
on two interrelated issues: The first involves a
comparative analysis of smart city discourses
and the deconstruction of the depoliticising
‘no alternative’ logics of actually existing
smart city initiatives. The second involves the
analysis of whether the inclusion of social
innovation into smart city strategies – as
argued and conceptualised in the SIRN – can
actually open up spaces for democratic dialo-
gue and facilitate the making of truly smart
and sustainable urban futures.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ina Horlings,
Alex Franklin, Andrew Karvonen and Stephen
Healy for their detailed and helpful feedback on
various versions of the manuscript. We thank the
anonymous reviewers for their critical remarks and
ideas to strengthen the initial submission as well as
the editor for his support in the process. This
research would not have been possible without the
commitment of the interviewees. We thank them
for their time, critical discussion and information.
Responsibility for the paper’s flaws and limitations
must of course remain with the authors.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of
interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
910 Urban Studies 57(4)
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following
financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: During the
latter stages of writing the manuscript,
S. Leitheiser was funded by the RECOMS project
within the European Union’s Horizon 2020
Research and Innovation programme under the






1. We understand radical transformations as
significant reconfigurations that produce
something novel (Blythe et al., 2018).
2. Dr Möhlendick is the city of Cologne’s
Climate Coordinator and part of the SCC
project management.
3. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
4. Projects are listed at: http://www.smartcity-
cologne.de/index.php/projekte.html.
5. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
6. City of Cologne, Mitteilung 1996/2012, June
2012. Translation by authors.
7. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
8. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
9. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
10. Interview, RheinEnergie SCC Project
Management, 29 August 2017.
11. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
12. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
13. Interview, RheinEnergie SCC Project
Management, 29 August 2017.
14. Interview, RheinEnergie SCC Project
Management, 29 August 2017.
15. Personal communication with SCC staff
member, 19 June 2018.
16. Interview, real estate company, 5 July 2017.
17. Personal communication with SCC staff
member, 19 June 2018.
18. Translation by authors. Source: http://www.
smartcity-cologne.de/index.php/partner.html.
19. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
20. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 7 July 2017.
21. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 7 July 2017. In the process of
writing, ‘Honig [honey] Connection’, a project
by Cologne’s beekeeping association, was
awarded the smart city label in October 2018.
However, Cologne’s beekeeping association
has phased out the project in early 2019.
22. Interview, citizen initiative, 1 August 2017.
23. Interview, citizen initiative, 17 May 2017.
24. Notice of the city administration to the
political committees, June 2012 (Mitteilung
1996/2012). Translation by authors.
25. Interview, citizen initiative, 18 July 2017.
26. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 7 July 2017.
27. Interview, citizen initiative, 30 May 2017.
28. AGORA Köln, available at: http://agorak
oeln.de/.
29. Interview with Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
30. Interviews, citizen initiatives, 17 May 2017; 1
August 2017.
31. Available at: http://tschoe-rheinenergie.de/.
32. Petition available at: https://weact.campa
ct.de/petitions/stoppt-braunkohle-in-koln-me






33. Interview, citizen initiative, 17 May 2017.
34. See: Kölner Grünen (2015) ‘Tschö
RheinEnergie’-Kampagne gegen das
Braunkohlekraftwerk Merkenich: Gut





35. Interview, RheinEnergie SCC Project
Management, 29 August 2017.
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36. Interview, Municipal SCC Project
Management, 8 May 2017.
37. The associated challenges of these ‘enabling’
actions for climate protection by the local
state are outlined elsewhere in more detail
(Bulkeley and Kern, 2006).
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